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L'l dealing with the problem of the constitutional frameworks of 
v.orld order, it is advisable to clarify first the interdisciplinary lo­
cation of the problem. 
The issue is one which belongs to the field of the academic 
discipline of International Legisl ation. The problem is not one 
which is primarily a lawyer's problem (lex Lata), but one of the law 
in the making or law to be (lex ferenda). It is one of social plan­
ning or social engineering. 
This will explain v.hy no lawyer has any particular clairn to be 
consulted on such matters in a professional capacity. He can, 
however, assist policy-makers in two ways in which he can make 
use of his particular training. First, more clearly than non-lawyers, 
he may see the legal and constitutional implications of proposals 
for change (primary criticism). Secondly, he ought to be able to 
v.ork out without undue difficulties the legal details of proposals 
de Lege ferenda or criticise such proposals on the basis of the 
maj or assumptions made by any particular policy-maker. 
There are a number of patterns from which decision-ma kers raay 
take their choice. Before dealing with these, it is probably ad­
visable to study exactly the major assumption on which concern de 
Lege ferenda with any such patterns is based. This is dissatisfac­
tion with the present state of world organisation, semi-organisation 
or anarchy. Such an attitude may be due co discontent with the 
position of the 'veto-Powers' in the Security Council of the United 
Nations, the purely optional character of the pacific settlement of 
international disputes, the lack of adequate provision for organised 
peaceful change, the imperfections of the machinery of collective 
security in the United Nations, the lack of provision fot the limita­
tion of armaments and disarmament or the weaknesses of the ex· 
isting economic world organisation. 
Assuming that this situation requires more or less drastic chan­
ges, the available patterns of reform can be classified under six 
major headings: (1) The United Nations �eform Model, (2) the One­
Way Model, (3) the Good-Faith Model, (4) the Sad-Faith Model, 
(5) the Federal �ode! and (6) the Regional Model.
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It must suffice to provide a few illustrations of primary criticism 
of each of these models. 
(1) The United Nations Reform Model. The most drastic and com­
prehensi ve blueprint under this heading is Clarlc-Sohn's World 
Peace through World Law. This is instructive; for, on closer scru· 
tiny, it becomes apparent that che realisation of this programme 
really presupposes the transformation of the United Nations into a 
world federation. 
In other words, the issue is whether this - like any other - pro­
posal de lege ferenda is necessary, acceptable and realistic. Like 
a long line of predecessors, the Clark-Sohn scheme certainly 
proves one thing. If it is desired, it is al ways possible, and not 
unduly difficult, to devise the requisite machinery for any type of 
international or supranational organisation. 
(2) The One-Way Model. Under this heading fall attempts to
solve the problem of international anarchy by advance on one of 
several fronts. All these proposals have in common one feature; 
they attempt to provide one single cure for all the world's evils. 
For instance, there is a plethora of proposals for the 'compul­
sory' or more wmprehensi ve automatic settlement of all intema• 
tional disputes by judicial or quasi-judicial international organs. 
The real problems posed by these proposals are of the first order. 
In the first place, it h as to be settled on v.hich basis (law, moral­
ity or expediency) such issues are to be solved. Secondly, it has 
to be ascertained whether States, and which Scates, are willing to 
grant so wide a discretion to any third party. 
It may also be mentioned that some of those in favour of such 
proposals probably have illusions about the certainty of interna· 
tional law. They also may be unaware of the fact that the border 
line between legal and non-legal di sputes is rather subjective. le 
is true that, potentially, every political dispute is a legal dispute. 
This implies, however, ,that the converse proposition is equally 
true. It is that it entirely depends on the parties to any disp ute 
whether they wish to solve it on the level of law, morality or ex­
pediency or not at all. 
It is similar with proposals for an international police force. :It 
is relatively easy to devise a command structure and satisfactory 
draft regulations on the manifold technical issues connected with 
its creation and maintenance. The crux of the matter is, however, 
to settle who is to give the orders to the police force to go into 
action. If this is left with political organs, we are faced again 
with all the deficiencies - and reasons for such deficiencies - of 
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organs such as the Security Council of the United Nations. If the 
matter is settled by reference to the device of standing orders, 
this merely means leaving politi cal decisions with the General in 
charge of such a force. Yet, to entrust political decisions to the 
milit ary, is probably the worst of all possible solutions. 
Another panacea would be to proceed towards the goal of world 
order through disannament. If the history of the evolution of law 
inside civilised communities is any guide, it is dear that disarma­
ment is the consequence of the establishment of a strong central 
order with overriding power. In the international field, the present• 
day high level of armaments and the cosmic rearmament race pro• 
ceeding in front of our eyes are evidence of the insecurity which 
exists in contemporary world society. This is the reason why con· 
ferences on disarmament, as distinct from conferences on the limi· 
cation of armaments on the basis of the present distribution of 
power, ,are predestined to be disappointing; for, in the absen ce of 
an overriding central order, disarmament can be only the conse• 
quence of existing confidence in an equilibrium between security 
and peaceful change that has already been attained. 
(3) The Good-Faith Model. This model relies on the pledged
word of States. It means accepting the signature and ratificatio n of 
treaties and hoping for the best. The trouble with this model is 
that world history is littered with broken promises and treaties of 
non-aggression and eternal peace which have culminated in major 
wars. 
In a politically and ideologically divided world, bills and coven· 
ants of Human Rights on a uni versalist level are further typical il· 
lustracions of this approach to the reform of international relations 
and organisation. The reason why, on a global level, there are 
bound to be failures in treaty observance is that the y lack the ne­
cessary sanctions machinery, without which they are hardly dif­
ferent in kind from any other set of ethical propositions. As Plato 
stated in The Laws, most of us are inclined to abide most of the 
time by most laws. The essence of law, however, is to be effective 
when, occasionally, any of us may be tempted to stray beyond this 
border line. 
This relation between the onerous character of certain legal 
norms and a correspondingly more pressing need for stronger sanc­
tions behind the law, also explains why, in the relations between 
homogeneous States in one and the same world camp, it is so much 
easier for conventions on human rights to be effective. In the rela­
tions between such States, such commitments are largely declara-
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tory of attitudes which are typical inside such communmes. All 
that is needed to watch in a treaty such as the European Conven• 
tion on Human Rights, are marginal contingencies when parties 
tend to fall short of standards which, on the whole, they are pre­
p ared to accept. 
(4) The Bad-Faith Model. In this model it is taken for granted
that the danger of a breach of an international commianent exists. 
Thus, provision is made for an array of sanctions which may range 
frorn diplomatic sanctions to economic and military sanctions. 
The war between Italy and Ethiopia and the sanctions experi­
ment against Rhodesia illustrate the lesson that the real issue is 
much more fundamental than advocates of the Bad-Faith pattern are 
likely to assume. It is the question of what will happen if limited 
sanctions of any type happ en to prove ineffective. 
Within the State this problem is solved because the physical 
force at the di sposal of the State is so overwhelming that, normal• 
ly, no need exists to evoke this ultima te means of pressure; for 
everybody concerned knows that resistance would be hopeless. Yet 
if, as in race riots in the United States of America and widespread 
terrorism in Ulster or, from time to time, in some of the new States 
as in the Lebanon, this order does break down, we are faced with 
a situ ation of semi-anarchy , not so different from that in interna­
tional relations. If even within the State, the government is occa­
sionally too weak to prevent a breakdown of the law, then it is
even less likel y that this pattern will be successful oo a universal 
level. 
(5) The Federal Model. In the abstract, this model solves effec­
tively a good many of the issues which experience proves cannot 
adequately be coped with on a confederate level. 
There are two variations of the federal model. The first is the 
model of territorial federation as it has been realised in the United 
States, Canada, Australia or p ost-1919 Gennany. The second is 
that of functional federation as it has been attained in the supra­
national Communities of Western Europe. The two models merely 
differ in their starting point. Whereas in the territorial type of fede­
ration foreign policy and defence are unified, in the functional 
type of federation the process of unification commences in the eco• 
nomic or financial field. In either case, the end envisaged is the 
minimum of unity and subjection to majority rule that is .required to 
achieve the common end, whether this lies in the political, military 
or economic field. 
In a world in which more than half of mankind lives under author-
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itarian or totalitarian governments and below the subsistence level, 
in which more than half of mankind consists of non•white popula• 
tions, and in which more than half of mankind are not monotheistic 
even in name, but believe only in what Thomas Hobbes termed 
'mortal gods', the realisation on a global scale of this model, too, 
is beset with formidable difficulties. 
(6) The Regional Pattern. This needs mentioning merely for the
sake of completeness . In a world in which any major war is likely 
to be a 'WOrld war, this pattern is merel y of minor interest in the 
field which matters most, that is, in that of international peace and 
security. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It will be seen from this survey that all the innumerable blu� 
prints for world order that, from time to time, are being advanced 
are represented by relatively few models and, in substa nce, are 
distressingly repetitive. 
The easier any of these schemes can be realised, the less it is 
likely to assist in attaining a true world order. Conversely, the 
more likely it is to achieve this putpose, the heavier is the price 
states will be asked to pay in terms of surrender of national so· 
vereignty ..-id cherished ways of life. Whatever the choice may be, 
specialists in the field of incemational legislation can safely be 
relied upon to provide any requisite constitutional moulds. If world 
order escapes our grasp, it will not be because legal planners have 
been found wanting. 
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